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There seems to be no end to the sovereign debt woes of Argentina in the near future, as 
the „holdouts‟ are accused of turning out to be vultures and are hell bent on their pound of flesh. 
The crisis has resurfaced as the Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, having been 
advised by her country‟s lawyers, to intentionally default on dollars of its sovereign debt in order 
to force a renegotiation of the debt and to take the case away from American judges. This is the 
second such default by Argentine in the last thirteen years. Expert analysts term this a bad 
advice, and Argentina continues to follow it. Even if Argentina nudges ahead to restructure all its 
sovereign debt outside US to avoid the jurisdiction of the US courts, it might further deepen its 
status as a pariah country. The debt crisis has indeed compounded the problems for Argentina as 
it is already imbued with an array of macroeconomic woes caused by the artificially overvalued 
currency leading to stubbornly high inflation, state subsidies that are sapping resources, and an 
abysmal business climate that has seen investment all but dry up. If the crisis is not resolved 
adequately, there is every danger of driving the Argentine economy into structural economic 
mess. Though, Argentina has had seven defaults since 1827 to 2001 that were mostly self-
inflicted, the 2014 default seems to be due to a sudden shift in the international sovereign debt 
regime fvaouring the „hold-outs‟ governed by US laws. The puzzle is how did it all happen? 
How can it be resolved? What is the way forward? What are the lessons to the other developing 
countries? 
 
The Crisis and the Consequent Default 
The Achilles‟ heel of Argentine economic strategy lies with its approach that has long 
relied on fiscal largesse as a basic policy tool, covering its shortfalls by expanding the money 
supply. This resulted in recurring bouts of high inflation and indebtedness, followed up by 
ephemeral efforts to stabilize prices. En route the end of 20
th
 century, Argentina experienced 
hyperinflation and brought in the new regime with the Menem-Cavallo cure for chronic inflation, 
the now infamous “convertibility plan.” Though, at first convertibility plan worked well, cracks 
in Argentine economic policy began to resurface due to the large fiscal deficits both at the 
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provincial and national levels. Compounded by the practice of rolling over, the sovereign debt 
began to grow from 1993. The overvalued Argentine Peso soon got overvalued reducing the 
country‟s international competitiveness followed by the typical declines in public revenues to 
service the mounting debt. Grappled with this indefensible state of affairs compounded with 
falling international credibility, financial panic, and political unrest, Argentina became defaulter 
in 2001 with the debt mushrooming from 45% of GDP in 2000 to 166% in 2002. The default 
totaled USD 97.6 billion with dues to private investors (USD 81.8 billion), the Paris Club 
countries (USD 6.3 billion) and the IMF (USD 9.5 billion) among other multilateral obligations. 
A sovereign default implies that the government is no longer willing or capable of paying the 
debt it has legally incurred in the international markets. 
 
Restructuring Saga 
Hit with the financial crisis, Argentina had to suffer capital flight and steep devaluation 
of currency leading to sudden evaporation of its wealth. As poverty and unemployment 
skyrocketed, leading to street protests and political unrest, Argentina began its efforts to 
restructure its sovereign debt in 2002. It faced three significant complexities: (i) negotiating an 
arrangement with private creditors, (ii) reschedule its obligations towards the Paris Club
1
, and 
(iii) reengage the IMF. Again, the problems began to compound with the Argentina choosing to 
engage in an antagonistic, hard line, and self-destructive behaviour rather than engage creditors 
in a negotiation, by way of insisting on a large write-down of principal for private creditors and 
postponing action on Paris Club and IMF debt. After protracted negotiations that lead to a 
standoff, eventually, Argentina suspended its agreement with the IMF and approached the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with an offer to settle with private creditors with the 
so-called “Ley Cerrojo (Lock Law)” that prohibited the government from making any kind of 
future offer on better terms, and suspended any future payments on the untendered debt. 
 
In 2005, it went ahead with its controversial bond exchange programme anticipating a 
final settlement with the private investors on the USD 81.8 billion debt plus the past due interest 
of USD 20.8 billion totaling a massive USD 102.6 billion. This unilateral offer by Argentina was 
                                                          
1
 The Paris Club is a voluntary group of 19 creditor nations who have, informally agreed to act with a common 
approach to negotiate debt relief for such developing countries that are unable to meet their external obligations.  
* Dr. Vighneswara Swamy is currently with Institute of Economic Growth Delhi as Senior Fellow. Page 3 
 
accepted by 76% of the creditors. Typically, successful restructuring negotiations have been with 
more than 90% of the creditors agreeing for the offer. Critics comment that had Argentina 
modified the offer, the deal would have been less expensive in the long run and would have 
garnered over 90% of the bondholders to accept the offer. With a large holdouts (24% of 
creditors), the restructuring process headed for furthermore complicacies. Nevertheless, out of 
USD 81.8 billion (face value) debt, Argentina could exchange USD 62.3 billion for $35.2 billion 
of new bonds leaving the past due interest unaddressed. Further, debt restructuring remained 
incomplete as USD 18.6 billion of bonds were not tendered and remained in dispute along with 
accrued interest, USD 6.3 billion of Paris Club arrears, and USD 9.5 billion of IMF debt. 
 
Buoyed by the 2003-2008 economic recovery, Argentina in a comfortable financial shape 
again embarked on sovereign debt restructuring in 2010 and exchanged USD 12.4 billion of the 
eligible USD 18.4 billion in bonds with 67.7% participation, leaving behind USD 6 billion 
untendered. Thus, Argentina contended that a “successful” exchange would be one that exceeded 
a 60% participation rate because it would allow for a total participation rate, including the 2005 
exchange, of over 90% of defaulted debt. If executed through mutually agreed negotiations, this 
threshold would have been adequate to resolve the default, allowing Argentina eventually to 
participate in international credit markets. 
 
The Holdout’s Problem 
Argentina states that it is in arrears for USD11.2 billion to the holdouts worldwide 
(including $6.8 billion in principal past and coming due, and $4.4 billion in past due interest 
through December 2010). On the contrary, holdout creditors dispute that this number could be 
USD 15 billion by 2013, of which USD 1.3 billion is being litigated by hedge funds in U.S. 
courts. While Argentina continues to argue that the restructuring succeeded the extensive 
negotiations, they cannot be construed as mutually agreed solutions as the bondholders had to 
accept or reject the offers with the alternative being the promise of no restitution at all. Holdouts 
have challenged the outcome in various courts as illegal under the pari passu provision of the 
bond contracts. 
Now the issue of intense debate among the legal circles is that of interpretation of the 
equal treatment provision of the bond contracts. The US district court found in favor of holdout 
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creditors who argued that paying the exchange bondholders while repudiating the holdout 
debtors has been a breach of this provision. An appeals court ruling in August 2013 in the 
Argentina v. NML Capital case, determined that holdouts should be repaid the full face value. In 
October 2013, the US Supreme Court affirmed the decision without comment. On the contrary, 
courts in Belgium, France, and Germany have ruled in favour of Argentina based on the equal 
terms clause. Argentina, on the other hand, claims that it cannot pay the holdouts because of the 
Rufo clause (Right on Future Offers) in the 2005 and 2010 debt negotiations would require the 
country to pay all of the bondholders the same amount of money. If Argentina pays the holdouts, 
it would also have to pay current bondholders their back interest, which would negate the very 
edifice of debt restructuring and could the cost of the Rufo clause could be around USD 120 
billion. The Rufo clause holds that in case Argentina voluntarily makes an offer to exchange or 
purchase the bonds held by the holdouts, it would have to make the same offer as well to the 
bondholders who already exchanged their Argentinean debt at a lower price in 2005 and 2010.  
 
The other important dimension of the Argentinean default resolution mess has been the 
role played by the NML Capital Limited, a Cayman Islands-based offshore unit of Paul Singer's 
Elliott Management Corporation. Accused by Argentina as a vulture fund, NML capital 
purchased the majority of their holdings in 2008 by paying around USD 49 million for a series of 
bonds of face value USD 220 million. With the subsequent boom in the market, the worth has 
grown to USD 832 million by 2014. NML Capital in turn has formed the American Task Force 
Argentina, a lobbying group against Argentine bond restructuring efforts, and sued to enjoin 
Argentina's ongoing payments to the bondholders who had participated in the earlier 
restructurings. NML capital lead by its aggressive founder, Paul Singer of US hedge fund Elliott 
Associates has been active in attempts to seize Argentine government assets abroad – notable 
ones being the attachment of Central Bank deposits in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
the presidential airplane, and the ARA Libertad (an Argentine Navy training frigate). Further, the 
dispute has limited Argentina's access to foreign credit markets as well.  
 
Blurred Sovereign Rating 
Argentina faces another problem of unclear sovereign ratings by the global ratings 
agencies. Following the recent 2014 ruling by a District Court Judge Thomas Griesa that 
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Argentina could not pay its bondholders unless Argentina also paid the holdouts in full has 
affected the New York Law Argentine bonds. In view of this, while, Standard & Poor's has put 
Argentina in the „selective default‟, Fitch has rated it as „restricted default‟. Moody‟s has put the 
Argentine bonds in „Junk‟ category. This might generate negative externalities for the private 
sector and real economic activity, as sovereign downgrades lead to greater increases in the cost 
of debt and greater decreases in investment and leverage of firms. Now the third largest economy 
of the Latin America has approached the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague to 
take action against the United States over an alleged breach of its sovereignty as it defaulted on 
its debt. 
 
The Possible Way Out 
 Some economists argue that Argentina should simply pay the “holdout” creditors and get 
over with, or at least try to haggle over a rate that works for both parties. But such a move of 
paying the court-ordered $1.5 billion to plaintiffs could expose Argentina to upward of $15 
billion in additional claims from other holdouts, and deplete the country‟s $28 billion in foreign 
reserves to its less than a half, which Argentina most probably cannot afford to. In another 
interesting development, the private sector has initiated to intervene as the Association of 
Bankers of Buenos Aires (ADEBA) was actively involved in talks with the holdouts in New 
York and was rumored to have offered to buy the debt from the vulture funds in a series of 
payments. In another development, international banks have approached private investors with a 
stake in Argentina‟s financial stability to buy the disputed debt and allow Argentina to resume 
servicing its bonds. Besides, Argentina has taken steps towards normalizing the economy and 
relations with the outside world. Moreover, this 2014 default is more of a technical default not 
because of the inability; Argentina should not be in a precarious position. At only one third of 
GDP, Argentina‟s sovereign debt is quite sustainable. In the short term, there might not be any 
severe noticeable impacts on the real economy, but it does not augur well for the long term. IMF 
needs to take a proactive stance to resolve the situation. As economist Roubini argues, the root 
cause for defaults lie in the government‟s state-centric economic policies and is scaring away 
investors and consumers alike. According to Roubini, Argentina has moved away from market-
oriented policies with imports substitution protectionist measures; national control over natural 
resources; a more predominant role for state companies and banks and discouraging foreign 
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investments and the influx of capital. He terms this a form of "state capitalism" which makes the 
country more vulnerable to any domestic or international turmoil. 
 
 On a theoretical perspective, typically, an inherent characteristic of global financial 
markets is that debtors and creditors systemically tend to overshoot, periodically giving rise to 
unsustainable debt situations that end up in a liquidity crisis or a default in the worst case. 
Sovereign defaults necessitate for (i) a better preventive regulation and/or (ii) better crisis 
settlement mechanisms. With the proliferation of Collective Action Clauses (CACs), there is at 
present, one instrument at work that facilitates coordination of the creditors of single bonds in a 
default situation. While the IMF‟s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) and the 
International Debt Framework (IDF) are more pragmatically oriented, the Fair and Transparent 
Arbitration Process (FTAP) is considered an ideal-type solution, in the sense that it is more 
inclusive, equitable, and maybe even more effective than all the other approaches but faces 
significant obstacles regarding its implementation. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Argentina has become almost as infamous for sovereign debt defaults as it is for its 
failures in the world cup soccer. That apart, the 2014 sovereign default of Argentina poses 
unsettling questions for policymakers. It is a fact that the country‟s periodic debt crises are often 
the result of self-destructive macroeconomic policies. However, in this case, the default is 
triggered by a significant shift in the international sovereign debt resolution mechanism; 
particularly the shift favors hard line creditors in bond issuances governed by US law. It is 
unfortunate that there is no steadfast cooperation from the US to IMF in establishing credible 
debt restructuring mechanism at place to ensure macroeconomic and global financial stability. 
Given the global economic scenario where there is slowing of emerging market growth and 
rising external debt, this trend of new interpretations by the judicial adjudicators make the future 
rescheduling more difficult and do not abode well for global financial stability. The take away 
for the developing countries from the Argentine sovereign debt trauma is to greatly deepen their 
domestic debt markets in the long run. Though domestic borrowing is not a panacea, but, to 
some extent, it can enable the countries stay away from the vultures in the global markets. 
